

The situation with Art stems from having more or less completed the task it laid out for itself at the start of the Modern era - that of defining itself. Having now exhausted all formal possibilities of what might constitute Art, it is compelled to, in strict adherence to the tactic of *pushing the boundaries*, claim to 'be' its adjacent disciplines. to ameliorate both situations simultaneously, and symbiotically. that is endeavoring to be more functional or effective, and often in ways that are typically associated with design or entertainment. This is certainly radical; it is its preordained evolution, requiring the familiar call for the appropriate redefinitions, yet -and this is confirmation of the mission's success- no longer meeting any resistance. But by having Art take on the characteristics of other things we are engaging in an exchange of territory. By taking some of theirs, we abdicate the authority over some of ours -maybe even all of either/or proposition with art. Art stands apart from all other endeavors because its operation is to represent (all other endeavors). Something in addition to what it appears to be- or not. So if art chooses to abandon this representation service, and all of the powers it contains, it loses its 'authority position'. If you want to advance art, there is a much more advantageous alternative to making art more like everything else, and that is to make everything else more like art. Let me offer a current example of how we could go about this. Recently, because of the vacancies on the Supreme Court, there has been reduced to two takes, right and left, conservative and liberal, in this case the Textualists and the Intentionalists. The former believe in a strict reading of what the constitution actually 'says', and the letter advocate speculating on the intentionalists. The former believe in a strict reading of what the constitution actually 'says', and the letter advocate speculating on the intentionalists. The former believe in a strict reading of what the constitution actually 'says', and the letter advocate speculating on the intentionalists. But an argument between what is said and what is meant is far from complete and leaves out an entire field of meaning from consideration. What I am referring to is all of the possible, unintentional meanings to be of potentially greater value than intentional ones is Art, and it is from art critique that we can learn much about interpretation that might be useful here. Artists, who often employ techniques to encourage inadvertent outcomes in their work, know that the really interesting material lies outside of the field of intention. It's this emancipation from the fascism of rational thinking to arise. One occupation3 of an artist, like a good shoe designer or constitution framer, is to be able to identify this potential when it renders itself and have the confidence to not edit it out. However, they need not explain it. In fact they ought not explain it, or for that matter anything else about their work. There is probably no more abominable and tedious class of writing than the artist claims it is 'about'? That is precisely what the Intentionalists recommend when it comes to interpreting the Constitution. Suppose instead we apply the methodologies of art interpretation to constitution interpretation to constitution interpretation? We could consider all the inadvertent and unintended, accidental meanings suggested in the text. We could examine the stilted and now archaic language for newly emergent, unforeseen connotations. Such a reading will nullify the narrow dialectic between the Intentionalists and Textualists by tapping a more enriched field of possibility. And while this field of meaning flourishes through a fracture in the puritanical system of logic, it also gives that system permission to evolve, and reminds us that the system itself is provisional. After all, we must keep in mind that the framers themselves believed in freedom above all else, were highly skeptical of existing systems, and proposed that mutability was the foundation of long-term viability. So what might be accomplished here, is that Art, and the methodologies conditional to it, might effectively colonize the field of jurisprudence,

thereby reifying its authority and extending its jurisdiction. Such interventions can be made in just about any field of endeavor infusing without limit Art's influence into that which it represents.